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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than two hundred years, the traditional rule in pet law has been
to limit damages to the market value of the animal that has been injured or
killed.1 This system has worked well, resulting in low and predictable costs
of veterinary services. Yet, some have regarded the system as overly harsh
because of the very strong emotions pet owners may feel when a pet is
injured or dies because of another's negligence.2 As a result, advocates of
change to the traditional damage rules in animal cases encourage courts and
legislatures to award non-economic damages in pet cases.
This article will describe these potential changes and the public policy
implications of changing the rules of damages in animal law. After briefly
describing the traditional rules of damages in tort law,3 an important
predicate to understanding the current unsound impetus to change, this
article will set forth the established law of damages with respect to pets and
other animals. 4 It will show how the movement to allow non-economic
damages in pet cases assaults fundamental principles of animal law. It will
also demonstrate several reasons why allowing non-economic damages in
1. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
2. See discussion infra Part III.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
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pet cases is unsound public policy.5 Next, this article will explain how
allowing non-economic damages in pet cases, particularly in those involving
mere negligence, harms veterinarians, manufacturers of pet medications, pet
owners, and even pets themselves. 6 Finally, it will then show that capping
non-economic damages in pet suits is not a helpful compromise, but a
dangerous misstep that is to be avoided.7
II. THE BASICS OF TORT LAW DAMAGES
Before addressing the question of whether non-economic damages
should be allowed in pet litigation, it is vitally important to understand the
traditional purpose of the basic types of damages available in the torts
system. This background will assist in understanding the public policy
arguments that follow.
A. Types of Damages Awarded in Tort Law
Under foundational tenets of tort law, there are two overarching types of
damages: compensatory damages and punitive damages. Compensatory
damages "are intended to represent the closest possible financial equivalent
of the loss or harm suffered by the plaintiff, to make the plaintiff whole
again, [and] to restore the plaintiff to the position the plaintiff was in before
the tort occurred.",8  The umbrella of compensatory damages includes
economic and non-economic damages. Economic damages compensate
plaintiffs for tangible injuries and are subject to objective measurement. 9
Examples of economic damages include lost earnings and medical
expenses." Non-economic damages compensate plaintiffs for intangible
injuries such as pain and suffering, loss of companionship, and emotional
distress. 1  In some jurisdictions, non-economic damages may also
encompass injuries such as the loss of enjoyment of life and other
unquantifiable injuries. 12 However categorized, the goal and purpose of
these damages is to compensate plaintiffs-not to punish defendants. 3
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Part V.
7. See infra Part VI.
8. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 519 (10th ed.
2000) [hereinafter PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS].
9. Id. at 530.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 530, 534-35.
12. See id, at 535-36.
13. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards:
Turning Compensation Into "'Punishment," 54 S.C. L. REv. 47, 59 (2002) [hereinafter Twisting the
Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards].
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Unlike compensatory damages, punitive damages consist of a sum
above and beyond compensating the plaintiff for the harm suffered.' 4 The
goals of punitive damages are to punish a defendant for his or her conduct,
deter a defendant from repeating his or her wrongful act, and prevent others
from engaging in similar conduct. 5 As punitive damage awards have
increased in size in recent years, there has been a movement to tighten the
legal controls that govern them. 16
Despite the clear and distinct goals of compensatory and punitive
damages, there has been a growing trend for plaintiffs' attorneys to use a
defendant's alleged bad acts to augment non-economic damages. In such
instances the fundamental purpose of non-economic damage awards to
compensate the plaintiff is upended. The defendant is punished, yet the
award is not subject to the extensive legal controls imposed to help assure
real punitive damages do not cross the constitutional line. This current trend
to twist the purposes of punitive and compensatory damages is unsound and
is incongruent with the clearly delineated function of compensatory and
punitive damages.' 7  It is important to recognize this current trend when
considering the actions of various courts in pet law cases.
14. PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS, supra note 8, at 549.
15. Id. at 519.
16. See Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards, supra note 13, at 52-59. The
Supreme Court first imposed controls on punitive damages in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991), where it held "that punitive damages... had 'run wild' ... and
should be subject to constitutional due process limitations." Twisting the Purpose of Pain and
Suffering Awards, supra note 13, at 52. Since that time, "the Court has increasingly placed legal
controls on both the amount and procedures for [punitive damage] awards while []emphasizing its
concern that... fundamental constitutional rights" will be infringed by "excessive punitive
damages." Id. These legal controls include: substantive due process restrictions on the amount of
punitive awards in Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18-23, and TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993) (indicating that punitive damages awards cannot be "grossly
excessive" or they will run afoul of the Due Process Clause); procedural due process requirements
for the assessment of punitive damages and for meaningful judicial review in Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (undertaking an extensive analysis of the common law role of judicial
review in assuring that punitive awards were not arbitrary or excessive and ruling an amendment to
the Oregon Constitution prohibiting judicial review of the punitive damages awarded by a jury
"unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict" violated the Due
Process Clause) and in Cooper Industries, Inc. v Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001)
(ruling that constitutional concerns required federal appeals courts to take a "thorough, independent
review" of the constitutionality of a punitive damages award, requiring de novo review of exemplary
awards rather than a less standard of review); and Commerce Clause limitations on the use of
activity outside the jurisdiction as a basis for punitive awards in BMW of North America v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996) (ruling that punitive damages awards should not be based on conduct that is
lawful in another state).
17. For a full analysis of this current trend to use compensatory damages to punish defendants,
see Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards, supra note 13.
B. Damages for Injuries to Property in Tort Law
Under traditional concepts of tort law, damages for physical harm to
property are based on the worth of the property." In the vast majority of the
cases, this is based upon the market value of the property, which "usually is
defined as what the property in question could probably have been sold for
on the open market, in the ordinary course of voluntary sale by a leisurely
seller to a willing buyer."'
' 9
As a general rule, non-economic damages are not allowed in cases
where a plaintiff claims injury to personal property due to negligence.20 In
such cases, "the courts in general appear to be extremely reluctant to allow
recovery for mental disturbance occasioned by a merely negligent injury to
chattels."'2  Though courts commonly consider emotional distress damages
in some real property contexts, such as nuisance cases, "[t]here appears to be
somewhat more reluctance to allow recovery where the plaintiffs mental
disturbance is caused solely by his feeling for his property as such, and not
by the violence or malice displayed by the defendant in committing the
tort.,
2 2
Several policy reasons underlie the traditional principle of not allowing
the recovery of emotional damages for injury to property in cases of mere
negligence. These reasons include:
(1) [T]he plaintiffs right to freedom from mental disturbance is not
one which the law undertakes to protect, so that one who works a
purely mental injury has breached no duty and committed no wrong,
(2) ... in most cases, such injuries are so remote from the normal,
foreseeable consequences of the wrong involved that they cannot be
said to have been proximately caused thereby, and (3)... such
damages are so subjective that they are beyond the capacity of the
legal process to investigate and evaluate, so that to entertain claims
18. PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS, supra note 8, at 547.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Kleinke v. Farmers Coop. Supply & Shipping, 549 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Wis. 1996)
(under Wisconsin tort law, "it is unlikely that a plaintiff could ever recover for the emotional distress
caused by negligent damage to his or her property."); Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632
P.2d 1066, 1071 (Haw. 1981) (recognizing that Hawaii allows damages for injury to property, but
noting that "Hawaii has devised a unique approach to the area of recovery for mental distress.");
Elizabeth Paek, Fido Seeks Full Membership in the Family: Dismantling the Property Classification
of Companion Animals by Statute, 25 U. RAW. L. REv. 481, 502 (2003) (noting that only Hawaii,
Alaska, Maryland, and Florida have extended emotional distress claims to property); W.E. Shipley,
Annotation, Recovery for Mental Shock or Distress in Connection with Injury to or Interference with
Tangible Property, 28 A.L.R. 2d 1070 § 2 (2004).
21. Shipley, supra note 20, at § 2.
22. Id.
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based thereon would open the door to fraud and greatly swell the
burden of litigation.23
As we will show in this article, non-economic damages have no place in
negligence actions brought by owners of animals because animals are
traditionally viewed as their owners' property.
III. THE LAW OF DAMAGES WITH RESPECT TO PETS AND OTHER ANIMALS
A. An Introduction to Pet Law Damages: An Historic Look at Animal
Lawsuits
Early animal law focused on injuries to people or land caused by pets.24
The early law required distinguishing between wild and domesticated
animals. Under the common law of England, the owner or possessor of a
wild animal was subject to strict liability if the animal caused injuries to
anyone.26 The owners of domestic animals, such as dogs, cats, sheep, or
horses, were "subject to strict liability only if [they] knew or had reason to
know that the animal had vicious propensities.,
27
The majority of American jurisdictions adopted the English common
law's imposition of strict liability with regard to wild animals.2 8 For
domestic animals, even though "the canard is often repeated that the
common law rule is that a domestic animal such as a dog (or cat) is entitled
to one bite," case history suggests that American jurisdictions have followed
the English rule that owners of domesticated animals are strictly liable for
injuries caused by an animal if the owner knows or has reason to know of
the animal's vicious tendencies. 29 The majority of American jurisdictions
determine that if a plaintiff cannot prove that the owner knew or should have
known of an animal's dangerous propensities, strict liability does not
apply.30 In that situation, the plaintiff has to prove that the owner was
negligent in order to recover.31
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS, supra note 8.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 685.
27. Id.
28. Id.




Finally, statutes in some states have made domestic pet owners strictly
liable for harms caused by their animals.32 These statutes usually cap the
amount of damages that can be recovered under this theory.33
B. Modern Pet Lawsuits: The Traditional Approach
1. Pets are Considered Property for Purposes of Tort Law
The law regarding an owner's responsibility for causing harm has
remained relatively stable for over two hundred years of American
jurisprudence. In recent years, however, there has been some movement to
change the law regarding a pet owner's claim for harm to his or her animal.
Under the traditional approach to pet lawsuits, which no appellate court has
yet to disturb,34 courts "have treated pets as simple personal property. 35 In
fact, one court has noted that courts holding otherwise would be "aberrations
flying in the face of overwhelming authority to the contrary. ', 36
While pets should be labeled as "property" for tort law purposes, it is
important to avoid the stigma associated with labeling pets as "simple" or
"mere" property. Characterizing animals as "property" under tort law does
not mean that animals are held in the same regard as inanimate objects, such
as a chair or a car. As a leading scholar on pet law, Professor Richard L.
Cupp has stated, "[e]motionally, the loss of inanimate property such as a
bicycle cannot be compared with the loss of a loved family pet.
3 7
32. See OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 955.28 (West 2004).
33. See, e.g., CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 31501 (requiring the owners of dogs who injure or
kill any livestock or poultry to pay twice the actual value of the animals killed or damage sustained
by the livestock or poultry owners).
34. See, e.g., Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001); Pacher v.
Invisible Fence of Dayton, 798 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); Bobin v. Sammarco, No.
CIV.A.94-5115, 1995 WL 303632 at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 1995) (mem.); Harabes v. The Barkery,
Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1144 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001); Kennedy v. Byas, 867 So. 2d 1195,
1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
35. Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Amber E. Dean, Veterinarians in the Doghouse: Are Pet Suits
Economically Viable?, THE BRIEF, Spring 2002, at 43, 43 [hereinafter Veterinarians in the
Doghouse].
36. Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (quoting Snyder v.
Bio-Lab, Inc., 405 N.Y.S.2d 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) ("[a]s with personal property generally, the
measure of damages for injury to, or destruction of, an animal is the amount which will compensate
the owner for the loss and thus return him, monetarily, to the status he was in before the loss") and
Stettner v. Graubard, 368 N.Y.S.2d 683 (N.Y. Town Ct. 1975) ("sentiment will not be considered in
assessing market value for purposes of determining measure of damages for destruction of dogs")).
37. Veterinarians in the Doghouse, supra note 35, at 47. Professor Cupp has also stated,
I certainly do not think of my dog as property; comparing my reaction to his destruction
with my reactions to the destruction of a lamp, a bicycle or clothing would be odious.
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Several courts determining that pets are property for purposes of tort law
recovery have emphasized this point.38 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in
determining that a dog owner could not seek non-economic damages for the
loss of her dog compassionately stated:
At the outset, we note that we are uncomfortable with the law's cold
characterization of a dog.., as mere "property." Labeling a dog
"property" fails to describe the value human beings place upon the
companionship that they enjoy with a dog. A companion dog is not
a fungible item, equivalent to other items of personal property. A
companion dog is not a living room sofa or dining room furniture.
This term inadequately and inaccurately describes the relationship
between a human and a dog.
Nevertheless, the law categorizes the dog as personal property
despite the long relationship between dogs and humans. To the
extent this opinion uses the term "'property" in describing how
humans value the dog they live with, it is done only as a means of
applying established legal doctrine to the facts of this case. 39
Another court has similarly emphasized the importance of not dismissing
animals as "mere property," stating, "[w]ithout in any way discounting the
bonds between humans and animals, we must continue to reject recovery for
non-economic damages for loss or injury to animals. 40
2. As Personal Property, Non-Economic Damages Are Not Available
for Harm to Pets
Because non-economic damages cannot be recovered for harm to
property, "the law is clear that pet owners cannot recover for emotional
But... [flor both pragmatic and moral reasons, we must resist the temptation to provide
emotional distress damages to pet owners suffering the deep and legitimate pain of losing
a pet to negligently inflicted harm."
Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Barking Up the Wrong Tree; Justice: Awarding Emotional Distress Damages
to Pet Owners Whose Animals are Harmed is a Dog of an Idea, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1998, at B5
[hereinafter Barking Up the Wrong Tree].
38. See, e.g., Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Wis. 2001).
39. Id. (emphasis added). See also Harabes v. The Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1146 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (quoting Rabideau, 627 N.W.2d at 798).
40. Pacher v. Invisible Fence of Dayton, 798 N.E.2d 1121, 1125 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
distress based upon an alleged negligent or malicious destruction of a dog,
which is deemed to be personal property.",4 ' This fundamental principle
applies whether a plaintiff seeks to include emotional harms in calculating
damages or sues under a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Courts that have reinforced this approach over the past twenty
years include those in Arizona,42 California,43 Connecticut," Florida,45
Georgia,46 Idaho,47 Illinois, 48 Indiana,4
9 Iowa,5 ° Kentucky, 5I Massachusetts, 52
Michigan,53 Minnesota,54 Nebraska,55 New Jersey,56 New York,57 North
41. Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
42. See Roman v. Carroll, 621 P.2d 307, 308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) ("A dog, however, is
personal property. Damages are not recoverable for negligent infliction of emotional distress from
witnessing injury to property.") (citation omitted).
43. See Harasymiv v. Veterinary Surgical Assocs., No. C-01-02588, 2003 WL 22183946 (Cal.
Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2003), at *3 ("Defendants' conduct outside of plaintiffs presence, and directed to
his pet cannot serve as a basis for any claim by plaintiff for emotional distress.").
44. See, e.g., Altieri v. Nanavati, 573 A.2d 359, 361 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989) ("[T]he Supreme
Court recently held that there can be no bystander emotional disturbance claims arising from medical
malpractice on another person. There is no reason to believe that malpractice on the family pet will
receive higher protection than malpractice on a child or spouse.").
45. See Kennedy v. Byas, 867 So. 2d 1195, 1197-98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (declining to
carve out an exception for veterinary malpractice to the rule that to recover negligent infliction of
emotional distress, the plaintiff must have experienced some "physical impact").
46. See, e.g., Carrol v. Rock, 469 S.E.2d 391, 393 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that, where cat
escaped from veterinarian's care, "[r]ecovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress is allowed
only where there has been some impact on the plaintiff that results in a physical injury.").
47. See Gill v. Brown, 695 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (holding that negligent
infliction of emotional distress is not available where defendant shot and killed plaintiffs donkey,
but plaintiff suffered no physical injury as a result).
48. See Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (I1. App. Ct. 1987)
(holding, where dog died from anesthesia in veterinarian's care, that a cause of action for emotional
harm or loss of companionship does not exist when harm is solely to property, including animals).
49. See Little v. Williamson, 441 N.E.2d 974, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (ruling, in a case where a
boy witnessed a Great Dane kill his puppy and injure his sister as she tried to protect the puppy, that
"our cases consistently hold negligent infliction of emotional distress, absent contemporaneous
physical injury, is not compensable.").
50. See Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Iowa 1996) ("[A]lthough we are
mindful of the suffering an owner endures upon the death or injury of a beloved pet, we resolve to
follow the majority of jurisdictions that do not allow recovery of damages for such mental
distress.").
51. See Ammon v. Welty, 113 S.W.3d 185, 187-89 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003) (ruling that family and
dog relationship was not the type that supported a claim for loss of consortium).
52. See Krasnecky v. Meffen, 777 N.E.2d 1286, 1287-90 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that
sheep owners had no cognizable claim for loss of companionship and society because wrongful
death statutes only apply to death of persons).
53. See Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that
"plaintiff requests that we create for pet owners an independent cause of action for loss of
companionship when a pet is negligently injured by a veterinarian. Although this Court is
sympathetic to plaintiffs position, we defer to the Legislature to create such a remedy.").
54. See Soucek v. Banham, 503 N.W.2d 153, 164 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the law
does "not find sufficient threshold evidence to sustain a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress" in animal litigation).
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Dakota,"5  Ohio,59  Oregon,6 °  Pennsylvania,6' Texas,62  Virginia,6 3
Washington,64 West Virginia,65 and Wisconsin.66 These courts have listed
various public policy reasons supporting their decisions.67  For instance, a
New York state court, in forbidding recovery of non-economic damages for
the loss of a pet, emphasized the realities of a legal system that cannot allow
unbounded recovery for every harm in people's lives:
While it may seem that there should be a remedy for every wrong,
this is an ideal limited perforce by the realities of this world. Every
injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters,
without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.68
55. See Fackler v. Genetzky, 595 N.W.2d 884, 892 (Neb. 1999) ("This court has clearly held that
animals are personal property and that emotional damages cannot be had for the negligent
destruction of personal property.").
56. See, e.g., Harabes v. The Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1146 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001) ("[T]here is no authority in this state for allowing plaintiffs to recover non-economic damages
resulting from defendants' alleged negligence.").
57. See, e.g., Schrage v. Hatzlacha Cab Corp., 788 N.Y.S.2d 4, 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) ("[P]ets
are treated under New York law as personal property, and the loss of a dog by reason of negligence
will not support claims by the animal's owners to recover for their resulting emotional injury.").
58. See Kautzman v. McDonald, 621 N.W.2d 871, 876-77 (N.D. 2001) (applying traditional tort
law to cases involving injury to animals).
59. See, e.g., Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assocs. Animal Hosp., 785 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003) ("Whether or not one agrees with the view that pets are more than personal property, it is
clear that Ohio does not recognize noneconomic damages for injury to companion animals.").
60. Lockett v. Hill, 51 P.3d 5, 7-8 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that witnessing the death of her
cat did not entitle the plaintiff to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
61. See, e.g., Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 865 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) ("Under no
circumstances... may there be recovery for loss of companionship due to the death of an animal.").
62. See Zeid v. Pearce, 953 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex. App. 1997) ("[O]ne may not recover damages
for pain and suffering or mental anguish for the loss of a pet.").
63. See Kondaurov v. Kerdasha, No. 042077, 2005 WL 2240986, at *5-*6 (Va. Sept. 16, 2005)
(holding that "[T]he law in Virginia, as in most states that have decided the question, regards
animals, however beloved, as personal property" and that damages for negligence resulting in harm
to property do not include non-economic damages.).
64. See Pickford v. Masion, 98 P.3d 1232, 1233-35 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that no case
has allowed for "emotional distress suffered because of injury or threatened injury to a pet").
65. See, e.g., Carbasho v. Musulin, No. 32288, 2005 WL 1545279, at *1 (W. Va. July 1, 2005)
(holding that "dogs are personal property and damages for sentimental value, mental suffering, and
emotional distress are not recoverable for the negligently inflicted death of a dog.").
66. See Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 798-99 (Wis. 2001) (barring a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress for pets).
67. See, e.g., Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
68. Id. at 628 (quoting Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 851 (N.Y. 1984) (Kaye, J.,
dissenting)).
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Furthermore, the court reasoned that if emotional distress could be recovered
for the loss of pets, it "would permit recovery for mental stress caused by the
malicious or negligent destruction of other personal property .... ,,69 The
court concluded:
Although we live in a particularly litigious society, the court is not
about to recognize a tortious cause of action to recover for
emotional distress due to the death of a family pet. Such an
expansion of the law would place an unnecessary burden on the
ever burgeoning caseloads of the court in resolving serious tort
claims for injuries to individuals. 70
Similarly, an Ohio appellate court held that pet owners cannot recover
for emotional distress for the loss of a pet because "Ohio does not recognize
a cause of action for serious emotional distress caused by injury to
property., 71 The court held, "this is the position that the vast majority of
jurisdictions take ... [and] is also the view our legislature and courts have
taken, by choosing to classify dogs as personal property.', 72  The court
detailed several factors supporting its holding, including "the difficulty in
defining classes of persons entitled to recover, and classes of animals for
which recovery should be allowed... [and] concern[s] about quantifying the
emotional value of a pet and about increasing potential burdens on the court
system.,
73
Additionally, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, applying Pennsylvania law, determined that Pennsylvania did
not allow recovery for non-economic damages, such as emotional distress,
due to injury to a pet.74 The court reasoned, "[f]irst, under Pennsylvania
law, dogs are personal property and are not persons., 75 Further, it found no
"controlling authority" to support the idea that "Pennsylvania would
recognize the relationship between a pet and her owner as the functional
equivalent of an intimate familial relationship for purposes of determining
liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress. '76 Finally, the court
stated, "Pennsylvania does not regard a cherished and beloved pet as a
unique form of personal property entitling the owner to more than the pet's
69. Id.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Pacher v. Invisible Fence of Dayton, 798 N.E.2d 1121, 1125 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
72. Id. at 1125-26 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 1126 (citations omitted).
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actual value., 7 7 As a result, claims for non-economic damages as a result of
injury to a pet would involve a "sweeping redefinition of personhood,
family, and personal property"-a drastic move that "Pennsylvania law has
not accepted. ' T
A New Jersey appellate court likewise determined that pet owners
should not recover non-economic damages for injury to their pets. 79 The
court stated that "there are practical reasons and public policy considerations
that weigh against such claims," including problems with "defin[ing] who
may be entitled to recover" and "identify[ing] the class of animals for which
a pet owner may recover."' Another policy consideration the New Jersey
appellate court enumerated for not allowing non-economic damages for the
loss of a pet "is the need to ensure fairness of the financial burden placed
upon a negligent defendant."'" The court cited testimony in one pet death
case regarding the value of the pet with estimates of the pet's worth ranging
from $100-$200 to "'as high as the national debt.' ' 8 2  According to the
court, "[s]uch testimony illustrates the difficulty in quantifying the
emotional value of a companion pet and the risk that a negligent tortfeasor
will be exposed to extraordinary and unrealistic damage claims. 8 3  An
additional public policy concern the court noted is the burden the availability
of non-economic damages could place on the already overburdened torts
system.84 The court reasoned that "allowing such claims to go forward
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Harabes v. The Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1142 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
80. Id. at 1145. The court quoted the Wisconsin Supreme Court's rationale in similarly holding
that pet owners cannot recover for non-economic damages due to harm to their pets:
We are particularly concerned that were such a claim to go forward, the law would
proceed upon a course that had no just stopping point. Humans have an enormous
capacity to form bonds with dogs, cats, birds and an infinite number of other beings that
are non-human. Were we to recognize a claim for damages for the negligent loss of a
dog, we can find little basis for rationally distinguishing other categories of animal
companion.
Id. (quoting Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 798-99 (Wis. 2001)). The court also
noted, "what is a pet to one person can seem as a menace to another." Id. (quoting Jay M. Zitter,
Annotation, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Due to Treatment of Pets and Animals, 91
A.L.R. 5th 545 (2001)).
81. Harabes,791 A.2dat 1145.
82. Id. (quoting Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 690 (Iowa 1996)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1146; see also Kennedy v. Byas, 867 So. 2d 1195, 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (In
rejecting a claim for emotional distress damages in a veterinary malpractice case the court held that
"while pet owners may consider pets as part of the family, allowing recovery for these types of cases
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would open the floodgates to future litigation." 5  Indeed, "[s]uch an
expansion of the law would place an unnecessary burden on the ever
burgeoning caseloads of the court in resolving serious tort claims for injuries
to individuals."86 Finally, the court found that since New Jersey does not
allow emotional distress claims under its Wrongful Death Act, "there is no
reason to believe that emotional distress and loss of companionship
damages, which are unavailable for the loss of a child or spouse, should be
recoverable for the loss of a pet dog., 87
3. The Value of a Pet is Based on Fair Market Value or Actual Value
Since traditional tort recovery for injury to property is the fair market
value of the property and pets are considered to be property, in a majority of
jurisdictions, when a pet is negligently injured or killed, its owner generally
recovers only its market value.88 Under this approach, "[t]he measure of
damages for injury to, or destruction of, an animal is the amount which will
compensate the owner for the loss and thus return the owner, monetarily, to
the status he or she was in before the loss. ' '8 9 Factors courts may consider in
determining an animal's market value include "the purchase price of the
animal, cost to replace the animal, age and normal life span, its breed, degree
and type of training, usefulness and desirable character traits, breeding
potential and/or unborn young, and (in livestock cases) loss of the animal's
produce." 90
Since, often, mixed breed pets have little or no market value,
"[c]ommentators suggest that the standard calculation ... , typically fair
would place an unnecessary burden on the ever burgeoning caseload of courts in resolving serious
tort claims for individuals.").
85. Harabes, 791 A.2d at 1145.
86. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (Sup. Ct. 2001)).
87. Id. at 1146.
88. Veterinarians in the Doghouse, supra note 35, at 43. See also Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858,
864 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (valuing a dog at its market value); Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309,
313 (Alaska 2001) (noting that the majority approach is to "generally limit the damage award in
cases in which a dog has been wrongfully killed to the animal's market value at the time of death.").
89. Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 691-92 (Iowa 1996) (quoting 4 AM. JUR. 2d
Animals, § 162 (1964) [hereinafter Animals]). See also Daughen, 539 A.2d at 864.
Under Pennsylvania law, a dog is personal property. The fundamental purpose of
damages for an injury to or destruction of property by [the] tortious conduct of another is
to compensate the injured party for actual loss suffered. As in this case, where the
property has been destroyed, the measure of damages would be the value of the property
prior to its destruction.
Id.
90. Veterinarians in the Doghouse, supra note 35, at 43. See also Nichols, 555 N.W.2d at 692
("In determining the measure of damages for injuries to a dog, factors include its market value,
which may be based on purchase price, relatively long life of breed, its training, usefulness and
desirable traits.") (quoting Animals, supra note 89, at § 165).
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market value, may not adequately compensate the pet owner for the loss."9'
In situations "[w]hen the market value cannot be calculated, some courts
allow a plaintiff to collect the 'actual value' (sometimes called the 'intrinsic
value') of the animal to the owner."92 Courts using this approach may factor
into a pet's value the money an owner originally paid for the pet, money the
owner spent on veterinary bills during the pet's life, costs incurred in
training the animal, and the loss of potential income or special services from
the animal (such as breeding fees or guide dog services).9"
Alaska follows this "actual value" approach.94  In Mitchell v.
Heinrichs,95 the Alaska Supreme Court held "[w]e agree with those courts
that recognize that the actual value of the pet to the owner, rather than the
fair market value, is sometimes the proper measure of the pet's value." 96
The court explained that where "there may not be any fair market value for
an adult dog, the 'value to the owner may be based on such things as the cost
of replacement, original cost, and cost to reproduce."' 97 The court detailed
that:
[A]n owner may seek reasonable replacement costs-including such
items as the cost of purchasing a puppy of the same breed, the cost
of immunization, the cost of neutering the pet, and the cost of
comparable training. Or an owner may seek to recover the original
cost of the dog, including the purchase price and, again, such
investments as immunization, neutering, and training.98
In courts using the "actual value" of the pet approach, some plaintiffs,
such as the owner in Mitchell, ask that the court consider the pet's
"sentimental value" in calculating its actual value. 99 "The vast majority of
courts" that calculate the "actual value" of a pet have declined such requests
and do not permit the court to consider the pet's sentimental value or the
91. Mitchell, 27 P.3d at 313.
92. Veterinarians in the Doghouse, supra note 35, at 47. Other courts refer to this type of
valuation as the "special or pecuniary value" of the pet to the owner. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v.
Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 561 (Tex. Ct. App., 2004) (quoting Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931,
932 (Tex. 1891).
93. See generally, Mitchell, 27 P.3d at 313. See also Veterinarians in the Doghouse, supra note
35, at 47.
94. Mitchell, 27 P.3d at 313.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 313-14 (quoting Landers v. Anchorage, 915 P.2d 614,618 (Alaska 1996)).
98. Id. at 314.
99. Id.
owner's loss of companionship.'0 0 Courts exclude sentimental value or loss
of companionship from their value calculations because these factors are
inherently subjective, easily inflatable, and potentially astronomical.' 0
Between simple fair market value and "actual value," the "actual value"
approach may be the most prudent and just approach, as well as one
consistent with sound principles of tort law. Occasionally, certain types of
property-such as family photographs or heirlooms--"have no market
value, simply because they are not salable."'' 0 2  Many times, in these
situations, market value would not be adequate compensation to the owner,
so that "[i]n these cases, there may be recovery of the value to the owner, as
distinguished from value to others."'0 3  Thus, "the 'personal value' so
awarded is determined by consideration of whatever factors may be relevant,
such as original cost of the property, the use made of it, and its condition at
the time of the wrong."'"
In animal cases, fair market value should be used for animals possessing
a marketable pedigree like show dogs or horses. But, this preference for
using market value should be "a standard not a shackle."'0 5 For the large
number of pets that have no fair market value, the "more elastic standard" of
actual value to the owner should be utilized in "recognition that property
may have value to the owner in exceptional circumstances which is the basis
of a better standard than what the article would bring in the open market."' 0 6
When determining an animal's "actual value," it is vital that courts do
not allow claimants to inflate the "actual value" of their pets by including
sentimental value or loss of companionship in the pet's actual value.
Allowing plaintiff's lawyers to seek vastly subjective and easily inflatable
loss of companionship and sentimental value damages creates the same
effect of awarding unbounded non-economic damages in these cases.
Providing the carrot of potentially astronomic damages may encourage
aggressive plaintiffs' lawyers to file flimsy claims that could add to already
overburdened dockets. Instead, courts should limit their consideration of
"actual damages" to ascertainable, direct, and real replacement costs
100. Veterinarians in the Doghouse, supra note 35, at 46-47. But, a minority of courts factor in
sentimental value or loss of companionship as factors included in a pet's "actual value." See, e.g.,
Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (11. App. Ct. 1987); Brousseau v.
Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (Civ. Ct. 1980) ("As loss of companionship is a long recognized
element of damages in this state, the court must consider this as an element of the dog's actual value
to this owner.") (citations omitted).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
102. PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS, supra note 8, at 548.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 548-49.
105. McDonald v. Ohio State Univ. Veterinary Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 750, 752 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1994)
(quoting Bishop v. E. Ohio Gas. Co., 143 Ohio St. 541 (1944).
106. Id.
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incurred during a pet's life, such as obedience training, initial vaccinations,
and the price of spaying or neutering the pet. This approach justly allows
owners to recover value for pets that have no traditional fair market value,
while avoiding the excesses that would accompany the availability of non-
economic damages.
IV. THE ASSAULT ON THE RULE OF LAW BY ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING NON-
ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN PET CASES AND THE ARGUMENTS FOR CHANGE
In a narrow set of circumstances, some courts and legislatures have
allowed non-economic damages in lawsuits involving harm to pets. As we
will show, allowing non-economic damages solely for an injury to a pet
twists the fundamental purpose of non-economic damages and uses them for
punitive, rather than compensatory purposes. Allowing unlimited and
unbounded non-economic damages in pet cases ignores lessons learned in
the context of wrongful death. Furthermore, it is clear that when courts
allow non-economic damages in pet cases, they undertake fundamental
changes to the common law that are best left to the legislature.
A. Challenging the Traditional Approach to Pet Lawsuits: The Movement
by Some Courts and Legislatures to Allow Non-Economic Damages in
Pet Lawsuits
1. Non-Economic Damages in Cases Involving Negligent Injury to a
Pet
A few outlier courts have allowed non-economic damages in cases of
negligently caused harm to pets.1 °7 In Campbell v. Animal Quarantine
Station,0 8 the Supreme Court of Hawaii, a court that has been uniquely
107. Courts have been somewhat more willing to allow non-economic damages in cases where
defendants intentionally cause harm to pets. See, e.g., Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2001); Gill v. Brown, 695 P.2d 1276 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985). Though these decisions
imprudently stretch the bounds of traditional tort law and allow non-economic damages for injuries
to property, they have not specifically elevated pets above other types of property in order to do so.
Rather, the few courts that have allowed noneconomic damages for negligent harm to a pet have
done so under the same criteria they use in awarding damages for negligent harm to other types of
property in general.
108. Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066 (Haw. 1981).
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sympathetic to expansion of tort law,1°9 recognized that it was the first state
to allow recovery "for mental distress suffered as the result of the negligent
destruction of property."11 In the sad facts of that case, a pet dog died due
to heat exposure after it sat in a hot transport van awaiting treatment at a
veterinary hospital."' The owners were allowed to recover for "injured
feelings and mental distress" even though they did not see the dog die, they
did not see the dog's body after it died, and they sought no psychiatric or
medical assistance as the result of the dog's death."
2
Even though the plaintiffs were "neither eyewitnesses to their dog's
death nor located within a reasonable distance of the accident," the court
held that it is enough that plaintiffs experience the consequences of the
harm." 3  In Hawaii, witnessing an event helps only to "determine the
genuineness and degree of mental distress" and a failure to witness the event
does not bar recovery. 14 Also, the plaintiffs did not have to present any
medical testimony to bolster their emotional distress claims because the
court held such evidence is only an "indicator[] of the degree of the mental
distress," not a "bar to recovery."' 15 At any rate, the court reasoned, "[b]y
limiting the total award among five people to $1,000.00, the trial court
indicated its awareness of the limited duration and severity of the distress
suffered by the plaintiffs.""' 6 In addition, the Hawaii Supreme Court stated
that it did not matter that the owners suffered no physical manifestation of
harm due to emotional distress because Hawaii also was "the first
jurisdiction to allow recovery [in emotional distress cases] without a




The defendants argued that allowing emotional distress damages for
negligent damage to personal property "would lead to a plethora of similar
cases, many which would stretch the imagination and strain all bounds of
credibility.""' 8 The court rejected the defense's argument, reasoning that
"Hawaii has devised a unique approach to the area of recovery for mental
109. Hawaii is one of the few states that holds that foreseeability is not an element of warnings
defect claims. See In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying Hawaii
law). Similarly, in the emotional distress context, Hawaii "became the first jurisdiction to allow
recovery without a showing of physically manifested harm." Campbell, 632 P.2d at 1068. Hawaii
courts are fairly unique in their continued reliance on the liberal allowance provided in Dillon v.
Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), to recovery for emotional distress. See Campbell, 632 P.2d at 1069;
Leong v. Tasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 765 (Haw. 1974).
110. Campbell, 632 P.2d at 1071.
111. Id. at 1067, 1071.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1069.
114. Id.
115. Campbell, 632 P.2dat 1070.
116. Id. at 1071.
117. Id. at 1068.
118. Id.
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distress" in its earlier holding that owners of a negligently-flooded house
could recover for emotional distress." 9 Further, the court noted that, since
its earlier holding, "there has been no plethora of similar cases" and, as a
result, "fears of unlimited liability have not proved true."' 2 ° Thus, the court
determined that it could award emotional distress damages for the loss of a
pet consistent with Hawaiian case law and public policy.
In Knowles Animal Hospital, Inc. v. Wills, 2 ' a Florida appellate court
under similar reasoning allowed dog owners to recover $13,000 for physical
and mental suffering for the death of their dog due to their veterinarian's
negligence. 122 The court allowed the jury to consider the owners' "mental
pain and suffering" because the defendant's act was "of a character
amounting to a great indifference to the property of the plaintiffs."'' 23
The court's leap from earlier cases to its conclusion that emotional
distress damages can be recovered for the negligent treatment of a pet is
tenuous at best. It cited one case allowing recovery of mental suffering and
anguish damages due to the intentional taking a child's body from her
parents' home by an undertaker and the later embalming of the body without
parental consent. 124 The other case cited involved an award of damages for
mental distress due to the intentional malicious destruction of a pet, not
negligence. 2 5 Both cases the court cited for support involved non-economic
damages as a result of intentional action, very different factual situations
from the negligence case the court had before it.
Finally, in Peloquin v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, a Louisiana
appellate court, without detailed analysis, held that the owner of an animal
could recover for mental anguish as the result of injury to the animal. 26 The
court appeared to base its decision on the statutory definition of a pet as a
"movable thing" and accompanying statutory rights and obligations. This
development was not entirely surprising given the fact that the common law
system is not an inherent part of Louisiana law and Louisiana courts have, at
119. Id. (citing Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970)). But see, e.g., Kleinke v. Farmers
Coop. Supply & Shipping, 549 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Wis. 1996) (stating that under Wisconsin tort law,
"it is unlikely that a plaintiff could ever recover for the emotional distress caused by negligent
damage to his or her property.").
120. Campbell, 632 P.2dat 1071.
121. Knowles Animal Hosp., Inc. v. Wills, 360 So. 2d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
122. Id. at 38.
123. Id. (citing Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950); La Porte v. Associated Indeps.,
Inc., 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964)).
124. Knowles Animal Hosp., 360 So. 2d at 38 (citing Kirksey, 45 So. 2d at 189).
125. Id. (citing La Porte, 163 So. 2d at 268).
126. Peloquin v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 367 So. 2d 1246, 1251 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
245
times, stretched tort law to its outer limit.'27 In that case, the owners of a cat
sued their neighbors who found the cat in their yard and took it to an animal
control shelter, where the cat was "put to sleep.' 28 The cat's owners did not
witness the event.'
29
2. Non-Economic Damages in Cases Involving Intentional Injury to a
Pet
Some courts have allowed emotional harm damages for intentional or
reckless infliction of emotional distress where the defendant deliberately or
maliciously harmed the plaintiff's pet.
Some of these cases allowing non-economic damages for intentionally-
caused harms to pets involved defendants who deliberately harmed the pets
in order to inflict emotional distress upon the owners. In these cases, courts
have reasoned that the tort occurred against the owner of the animal and not
the pet, and therefore applied the traditional criteria for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 3 ° For example, in Burgess v. Taylor,'3 ' the plaintiffs
boarded their horses with defendants who later sold the horses for slaughter.
A Kentucky appellate court allowed the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim of the owners to continue, refusing to preclude the claim
"simply because the facts giving rise to the claim involve an animal."' 3 2 In
these cases, the courts consider a pet's unique and sentimental value to be
relevant only in assessing whether the defendant's conduct was so
127. For example, Louisiana courts have held that there is a duty to rescue. See, e.g., Marsalis v.
La Salle, 94 So. 2d 120 (La. Ct. App. 1957) (cat bite case). The Louisiana Supreme Court has held
that absolute liability applies in product cases. See also Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484
So. 2d 110 (La. 1986). Halphen was an extreme case that created absolute liability for products
found to be unreasonably dangerous per se. See id. Under the Halphen absolute liability standard,
manufacturers were potentially liable for risks involving their products that were neither known nor
discoverable, and as a result unpreventable at the time of sale. Id. Which products, if any, would
fall into the "unreasonably dangerous per se" category was essentially unknowable. The specter of
absolute liability hunted all products, even those as mundane as escalators and freight elevators. See
also Brown v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 514 So. 2d 439 (La. 1987), reh'g denied, 516 So. 2d 1154
(1988) (finding that an escalator was unreasonably dangerous as to children); McCoy v. Otis
Elevator Co., 546 So. 2d 229 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 551 So. 2d 636 (La. 1989) (finding
that a doorless freight elevator installed in 1923 but maintained by a company other than the
manufacturer since 1962 was unreasonably dangerous per se as to electrician injured during
renovation in 1982, without evidence of a single prior accident). The Louisiana Products Liability
Act ("LPLA"), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.51-60 (2005), was enacted to bring Louisiana into the
"mainstream" of American law, superceding the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Halphen.
128. See Peloquin, 367 So. 2d at 1248 (using the word "destroyed.")
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Miller v. Peraino, 626 A.2d 637 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
131. 44 S.W.3d 806 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
132. Seeid. at813.
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outrageous that it meets the criteria for an intentional or reckless infliction of
emotional distress claim against the owner. 
133
A small handful of courts have allowed owners to collect emotional
harm damages when a defendant's malicious acts were directed solely
against an animal. In La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc. ,3' a garbage
collector killed a dog by hurling a garbage can at it in the view of its owner.
When the owner went up to the dog, the garbage collector "laughed and
left., 135 The court determined the defendant was liable for damages due to
the plaintiffs emotional harm. 136 In City of Garland v. White,'3 7 police
officers entered the private property of pet owners and shot their pet, absent
any provocation, resulting in shotgun pellets hitting the house "very near to"
where the owners were seated. 38 The court held the officers liable for the
owner's emotional harm.' 39 Finally, in Banasczek v. Kowalski,140 a court
allowed the owners of a "maliciously destroyed pet" to collect emotional
harm damages even though they did not see the defendant shoot their two
dogs. 14' The court noted that this type of claim "should not be confused with
a claim for the sentimental value of a pet, [which is] unrecognized in most
jurisdictions."' 142
3. Some Legislatures Have Unwisely Allowed Non-Economic
Damages in Pet Cases, but Most Legislative Attempts to Allow
These Damages Have Failed
Since the overwhelming majority of courts have determined that non-
economic damages cannot be awarded in pet cases, legislatures are
increasingly being asked to enact legislation allowing these damages.
Tennessee and Illinois are the only states to have enacted such statutes,
though both are fairly limited in their application. 
143
133. Miller, 626 A.2d at 640 ("intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot legally be
founded upon.., behavior toward an animal.").
134. 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964).
135. Id. at 268.
136. Id. at 268-69.
137. 368 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963).
138. Id. at 15.
139. Id. at 17.
140. No. 9009 of 1978, 1979 WL 489, at *2 (Pa. Corn. Pl. Jan. 30, 1979).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/16.3 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (Supp. 2004).
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The Tennessee statute is the only pet-specific law that allows for
damages where a person or a person's animal negligently or intentionally
kills another's animal, though it explicitly excludes actions against
veterinarians, shelters and law enforcement officers.' In addition, the
statute applies only where the harm took place on the owner/caretaker's
property or "while under the control and supervision of the deceased pet's
owner or caretaker," such as by being on a leash. 45 In these instances, the
owner can recover "up to five thousand dollars ($5,000) in non-economic
damages." 146  The statute also provides that "[n]oneconomic damages
awarded pursuant to this section shall be limited to compensation for the loss
of the reasonably expected society, companionship, love and affection of the
pet."
147
The Illinois statute allows recovery only for non-economic damages
when the animal is subject to an act of aggravated cruelty or torture or is
injured or killed in bad faith when seized or impounded. 48 The owner can
seek damages including, but "not limited to, the monetary value of the
animal, veterinary expenses incurred on behalf of the animal, any other
expenses incurred by the owner in rectifying the effects of the cruelty, pain,
and suffering of the animal, and emotional distress suffered by the
owner."' 149 The statute does not allow for non-economic damages for acts of
negligence that harm an animal.
In addition to the enacted legislation in Tennessee and Illinois,
proponents of expanded damages in pet lawsuits have introduced legislation
to allow non-economic damages in pet cases in the state legislatures of New
Jersey, 150 New York, 5' Massachusetts, 5 2 Rhode Island,' California,
15 4
144. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(e).
145. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(a)(1).
146. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(a)(1).
147. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(d).
148. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 70/16.3.
149. Id.
150. H.D. 2411, 21 1th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2004); H.D. 2012, 21 1th Leg, Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2004)
As introduced, the parallel bills would permit loss of companionship damages of up to $20,000. Id.
The part of the bill allowing loss of companionship damages was deleted in committee.
151. H.D. 4545, 226th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003) (permitting recovery of up to $5,000 for non-
economic damages for the death or injury of a companion animal); H.D. 6340, 226th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2003) (permitting the pet itself the right to be compensated for pain, suffering, and loss
of faculties; would permit the courts to appoint guardians to sue on the pet's behalf for its injuries;
would also permit the owner to recover for "the loss of reasonably expected society, companionship,
comfort, protection and services of the injured companion animal ...."); H.D. 2791, 226th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003) (same).
152. H.D. 932, 183rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2003) (permitting owner to recover for "the loss of
reasonably expected society, companionship, comfort, protection and services of the injured
animal ... ;" pets themselves to recover for, "pain, suffering, and loss of faculties;" the courts to
appoint a guardian ad litem or a next friend to sue on the pet's behalf for its injures).
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Colorado,'55 Mississippi, 156 and Michigan. 57  Fortunately, these attempts
have largely been unsuccessful. In Colorado, for example, the backlash
against the bill was so severe that the state lawmaker who introduced the
legislation ultimately killed his own bill. 58  As the Denver Post
editorialized, allowing pet owners to recover non-economic damages would
have "unintended consequences-and actually may work against getting the
medical care our dogs and cats need."' 9  Specifically, it would lead to
defensive pet medicine, "put ordinary veterinary care beyond the reach of
poorer households," and keep some people from spaying or neutering their
pets. 160
The vast number of states in which such legislative attempts have been
made indicates that proponents of this type of legislation most likely will
continue their efforts to enact legislation in other states.
B. The Movement to Allow Non-Economic Damages in Pet Cases Is
Unsound Public Policy
1. Allowing Non-Economic Damages in Pet Cases Often Twists the
Fundamental Purpose of Non-Economic Damages
Advocates of allowing non-economic damages in pet cases often
improperly twist the fundamental compensatory purpose of non-economic
damages into a punitive focus. For instance, one commentator advocating
non-economic damages in pet cases writes "'the tort system strives to
153. H.D. 2593, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess., (R.I. 2004) (permitting recovery of up to $10,000 for
non-economic damages for the death or injury of a companion animal).
154. H.D. 225, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess., (Cal. 2003) (permitting recovery of up to $4,000 for
non-economic damages for the death or injury of a companion animal).
155. H.R. 1260, 64th Gen. Assem.,, Reg. Sess., (Colo. 2003) (permitting recovery of up to
$100,000 for non-economic damages for the death or injury of a companion animal).
156. H.R. 109, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess., (Miss. 2004) (permitting recovery of up to $5,000 for "the
owner's loss of companionship and affection of the pet" in non-economic damages for the death or
injury of a companion animal).
157. H.D. 1379, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess., (Mich. 2001) (permitting recovery of up to $250,000 in
non-economic damages for the death or injury of a companion animal).
158. See Julia C. Martinez, Pet Bill Killed by House Sponsor Move Outrages Senate Backer,
DENVER POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at BI.
159. Editorial, Pet Law Barks Up Wrong Tree, DENVER POST, Feb. 12, 2003, at B6.
160. Id. After observing that such a bill also would put pets above children in terms of the
parents' ability to recover, the Post stated that a "better title [for the bill] would be 'the Tort
Lawyers' Income Relief Act of 2003."' Id.
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compensate victims, affirm societal values, and deter wrongful conduct. The
emotional harms wrought by the death of a companion animal must be
recognized if these goals of tort law are to be fulfilled."" 16 1  Another,
referring to the use of non-economic damages in lawsuits against
veterinarians, suggests that "[t]he economic impact of permitting non-
economic damages supports the tort goal of deterring future bad acts.' 62
Yet another contends that "[v]aluing companion animals at fair market
value, however, poorly serves tort goals of efficient compensation for loss
and deterrence of future harm."'
163
As stated earlier in this article,'6 the clearly delineated goals of
compensatory and punitive damages have become increasingly blurred in
recent years. Punitive damages are intended to punish a defendant's
wrongful conduct and deter that individual and others from engaging in
similar misconduct in the future. 165 Compensatory damages, including non-
economic damages, compensate tort victims for personal injuries and
economic losses with the goal of "making the plaintiff whole.' 66 Despite
these fundamental distinctions, it is clear that many advocates of non-
economic damages in pet law cases highlight the potential of these damages
to deter behavior that harms animals.
A great danger lies in these attempts to twist the purpose of non-
economic damages into the goal of deterrence. Very likely, these
improperly-awarded damages will not be reconsidered on appeal. Since
non-economic damage awards are inherently subjective, generally, courts
will not second-guess the jury's decision-making. This "hands off"
approach creates the opportunity for plaintiffs' lawyers to manipulate the
system by using the defendant's alleged "bad acts" to augment non-
economic damages. Without proper oversight by trial courts, plaintiffs
counsel can direct the jury away from the needs of their clients and toward
161. Sonia S. Waisman & Barbara R. Newell, Recovery of "Non-Economic" Damages for
Wrongful Killing or Injury of Companion Animals: A Judicial and Legislative Trend, 7 ANIMAL L.
45, 65 (2001) (quoting Debra Squires-Lee, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion
Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1080-81 (1995)).
162. Rebecca J. Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 479, 530-31
(2004).
163. Elaine T. Byszewski, Valuing Companion Animals in Wrongful Death Cases: A Survey of
Current Court and Legislative Action and a Suggestion for Valuing Pecuniary Loss of
Companionship, 9 ANIMAL L. 215, 240 (2003).
164. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
165. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (noting that punitive damages "are
not compensation for injury... [but] are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible
conduct and to deter its future occurrence."); W. PAGE KEETON et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS, § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (explaining that punitive
damages are awarded to punish defendant, teach defendant not to "do it again," and deter others
from similar behavior).
166. See Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards, supra note 13, at 50.
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the wrongdoing of defendants, improperly mixing the fundamental
compensatory purpose of non-economic and punitive damages. The
defendant is then "punished" by an award not subject to the extensive legal
controls that help assure that real punitive awards do not cross the
constitutional line. Any trend to use non-economic damages in pet cases to
"punish" should be halted in its tracks.
Furthermore, even if the deterrence of improper veterinary conduct were
a proper focus of economic damages in pet cases, there is no real or
perceived need to deter current veterinary behavior. The public holds
veterinarians in high regard, considering veterinarians to hold one of
America's most well-respected professions. 167  In fact, a Gallup poll
surveying 1,000 adults showed that veterinarians placed in the top three
professions in terms of honesty and ethics, following only nurses and
doctors. 168  Furthermore, state and professional boards of veterinary
medicine provide avenues for citizens to file complaints alleging negligence
and malpractice. 69  These boards regulate veterinary behavior by
professionally disciplining vets who violate board standards.17
0
2. Allowing Unlimited and Unbounded Non-Economic Damages in
Pet Cases Ignores the Dillon v. Legg Experience
a. Dillon v. Legg and Thing v. La Chusa
The California Supreme Court's line of emotional distress cases for
those who witness the death of a close relative is germane to the issue of non
economic damages for the loss of a pet. In Dillon v. Legg,17 ' the California
Supreme Court allowed a mother and sister who witnessed the death of a
167. The Gallup Organization, Public Rates Nursing as Most Honest and Ethical Profession:
Image of the Clergy Recovers to Late 1990s Level, Is Still Lower than in 2000 and 2001, Dec. 1,
2003, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/content/login.aspx?ci-9823 [hereinafter Gallup Organization]
(last visited Dec. 14, 2004); Joseph Carroll, Public Rates Nursing as Most Honest and Ethical
Profession: Image of the Clergy Recovers to Late 1990s Level, Is Still Lower than in 2000 and 2001,
GALLUP ORG. POLL ANALYSES, Dec. 1, 2003, at
http://www.mycoolcareer.com/news/news_121203.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2004).
168. See Gallup Organization supra note 167.
169. See, e.g., Cal. Veterinary Med. Bd., Filing a Complaint, at http://www.vmb.ca.gov/comp-
inf.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2005).
170. See, e.g., Maine Dep't of Prof'I & Fin. Regulation, Disciplinary Actions, at
http://www.state.me.us/pfr/olr/avda02.htm#40 (last visited Apr. 13, 2005) (enumerating disciplinary
actions taken in the year 2002).
171. 441 P.2d at 912, 912-13 (Cal. 1968).
child hit by a car to recover non-economic damages for emotional distress.
Both were allowed to recover even though the mother was not "within the
zone of danger" of the car that hit the victim and the sister was only arguably
"within the zone of danger" of the accident.'72
The court determined that both the mother and the sister could recover
because the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that hitting and
killing the girl would result in emotional distress to her mother and sister.'73
The court embraced this "reasonable foreseeability" test, rejecting the more
predictable zone-of-danger rule and impact rule. 7 4 The court stated that
courts using its foreseeability test should take into account such factors as
the following:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as
contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether
the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff
from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident,
as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its
occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely
related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the
presence of only a distant relationship. 75
The court held that since its test "is inherently intertwined with
foreseeability[,] such duty or obligation must necessarily be adjudicated only
upon a case-by-case basis."
176
Two decades later, in Thing v. La Chusa,17 7 the California Supreme
Court retreated from its holding in Dillon. In Thing, the court determined
that a mother who did not witness an automobile striking and injuring her
child could not recover for the emotional distress she suffered when she
arrived at the accident scene.77 The court held that the foreseeability test
articulated in Dillon and its factors had been relaxed in post-Dillon cases
where "[l]ittle consideration ha[d] been given ... to the importance of
avoiding the limitless exposure to liability that the pure foreseeability test of
'duty' would create and towards which these decisions have moved."' 179 The
court rejected Dillon's foreseeability test, recognizing Dillon's test "is
172. Id. at 915.
173. Id.at921.
174. Id. at 915 (noting "[t]he zone-of-danger concept must, then, inevitably collapse because the
only reason for the requirement of presence in that zone lies in the fact that one within it will fear the
danger of impact.") (emphasis in original).
175. Id. at 920.
176. Id.
177. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989) (en banc).
178. Id. at 815.
179. Id. at 821.
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endless because foreseeability, like light, travels indefinitely in a
vacuum."1
80
In Thing, the court abandoned Dillon's case-by-case foreseeability
analysis in favor of a "clear rule under which liability may be
determined."' 18 The court noted that "drawing arbitrary lines is unavoidable
if we are to limit liability and establish meaningful rules for application by
litigants and lower courts.' 182 The court held that, rather than a potentially
infinite foreseeability test, "a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional
distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person
if, but only if" the plaintiff."'83
(1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene
of the injury producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware
that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers
serious emotional distress-a reaction beyond that which would be
anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal
response to the circumstances.
184
The court explained that the victim must be closely related to the
plaintiff claiming emotional distress because "in common experience, it is
more likely that [persons closely related by blood or marriage] will suffer a
greater degree of emotional distress than a disinterested witness to
negligently caused pain and suffering or death."' 85  Even though "[s]uch
limitations are indisputably arbitrary since it is foreseeable that in some
cases unrelated persons have a relationship to the victim or are so affected
by the traumatic event that they suffer equivalent emotional distress," "[n]o
180. Id. at 823 (quoting Newton v. Kaiser Founds. Hosps., 228 Cal. Rptr. 890, 893 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
181. Thing, 771 P.2d at 827.
182. Id. at 828.
183. Id. at 829. A few state courts have recognized a bystander exception, but only for witnessing
a brutal accident involving a spouse, child or sibling. If the spouse, child or sibling is injured or
killed elsewhere, such as in most medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff may not recover under
negligent infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Roman v. Carroll, 621 P.2d 307 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1980). Courts addressing these issues in animal cases have rejected bystander emotional distress
claims as well as claims for veterinary malpractice. See, e.g., id.; Coston v. Reardon, No. 063892,
2001 WL 1467610 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 2001); Holbrook v. Stansell, 562 S.E.2d 731 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2002).
184. Thing, 771 P.2d at 829-30.
185. Id. at 828.
policy supports extension of the right to recover.., to a larger class of
plaintiffs." 186
The court noted that if it continued allowing recovery for all who could
foreseeably be affected by the death of a loved one, liability could be
limitless because emotional distress occurs unavoidably when one's loved
one suffers, "regardless of the cause of the loved one's illness, injury, or
death." '187 Therefore, "[e]ven if it is 'foreseeable' that persons other than
closely related percipient witnesses may suffer emotional distress, this fact
does not justify the imposition of what threatens to become unlimited
liability for emotional distress on a defendant whose conduct is simply
negligent.' 1
88
The court also explained the purpose of its requirement that plaintiffs
claiming emotional distress must be present at the scene of the injury. 8 9
This factor helps "distinguish[] the plaintiffs resultant emotional distress
from the emotion felt when one learns of the injury or death of a loved one
from another, or observes pain and suffering but not the traumatic cause of
the injury."19°  This limitation "to plaintiffs who personally and
contemporaneously perceive the injury-producing event and its traumatic
consequences" provides "[g]reater certainty and a more reasonable limit on
the exposure to liability for negligent conduct."' 191
b. Dillon and Thing and the Rejection of Bystander Claims in Pet
Cases
The court's reasons for restricting emotional distress claims are all
relevant to the issue of whether these damages should be awarded in pet
cases. In fact, courts refusing to allow non-economic damages in pet cases
have recognized that bystander emotional distress cases are instructive in
animal lawsuits.' 92 These cases cite as reasons for barring recovery the fact
that the owners did not witness the injury-causing event or the fact that the
owners are not closely related to the pet.' 93 Cases also cite difficulties with
determining the class of animal for which owners would be able to recover
186. Id.
187. Id. at 829.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 828.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Iowa 1996); Harabes v. The Barkery,
Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1145 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Pacher v. Invisible Fence of Dayton,
798 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
193. See, e.g., Nichols, 555 N.W.2d at 691.
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for emotional distress and with defining the class of individuals who could
recover for injuries to pets.194
In Rabideau v. City of Racine,'95 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
determined that since emotional distress cases are limited to a closed set of
close family members, pets cannot fit into that category. The court held that
allowing emotional distress claims by a pet's "human companion" "enter[s]
a field that has no sensible or just stopping point." 196 It determined that:
First, it is difficult to define with precision the limit of the class of
individuals who fit into the human companion category. Is the
particular human companion every family member? the owner of
record or primary caretaker? a roommate? Second, it would be
difficult to cogently identify the class of companion animals
because the human capacity to form an emotional bond extends to
an enormous array of living creatures.
197
As a result, the court held that "in this case the public policy concerns
relating to identifying genuine claims of emotional distress, as well as
charging tortfeasors with financial burdens that are fair, compel the
conclusion" that allowing emotional distress claims by the "human
companion" of an animal "will not definitively meet public policy
concerns."
198
The court recognized that, like emotional distress claims by humans
who are not close relatives of the victim, cutting off the class short of
allowing recovery for pets is inherently arbitrary:
We agree, as we must, that humans form important emotional
connections that fall outside the class of spouse, parent, child,
grandparent, grandchild or sibling. We recognize[] ... that
emotional distress may arise as a result of witnessing the death or
injury of a victim who falls outside the categories established in tort
law. However, the relationships between a victim and a spouse,
parent, child, grandparent, grandchild or sibling are deeply
embedded in the organization of our law and society. The
emotional loss experienced by a bystander who witnessed the
194. See Harabes, 791 A.2d at 1145; Pacher, 798 N.E.2d at 1126.





negligent death or injury of one of these categories of individuals is
more readily addressed because it is less likely to be fraudulent and
is a loss that can be fairly charged to the tortfeasor. 199
Due to these public policy considerations, the court "conclude[d] that
[the pet owner] cannot maintain a claim for the emotional distress caused by
negligent damage to her property."2 °
c. Courts Awarding Non-Economic Damages in Pet Cases Allow
Recovery in Instances Where Humans Could Not Recover Under
Thing v. La Chusa
Courts and legislatures that have allowed non-economic damages in pet
cases have allowed owners to recover for pets and other property in
situations in which even close family members could not recover under the
Thing v. La Chusa standard.20 ' The Hawaii Supreme Court in Campbell
specifically refused to apply even Dillon's guidelines-guidelines much
more liberal than those in Thing 0 2-noting that the factors "should be
utilized to determine the genuineness and degree of mental distress, rather
than to bar recovery." 203 Furthermore, in all three state court cases allowing
non-economic damages for injuries to pets and other property, the owners
were not present to witness the injury to the pet.2°
Likewise, the statutes that have been enacted to allow non-economic
damages do not meet the Thing v. La Chusa standard of ensuring genuine
emotional distress. The Illinois statute contains no requirement that the
owner be present at the scene of the injury to the animal or simultaneously
aware of the injuries.205 Further, it contains no requirement that owners
must prove that they suffered serious emotional distress.20 6 The Tennessee
statute provides that the injury must occur "on the property of the deceased
pet's owner or care-taker, or while under the control and supervision of the
deceased pet's owner or caretaker., 20 7  Yet these requirements do not
199. Id. at 801.
200. Id. at 802.
201. See Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1069 (Haw. 1981).
202. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.a.
203. Campbell, 632 P.2d at 1069.
204. Campbell, 632 P.2d at 1067 ("None of the plaintiffs saw the dog die, nor did any of them see
the deceased body of [the dog.]"); Knowles Animal Hosp., Inc. v. Wills, 360 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (explaining in the brief opinion that the pet died in the hospital, after being
there almost two days, and making no mention of the presence of the owners); Peloquin v. Calcasieu
Parish Police Jury, 367 So. 2d 1246, 1248 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (explaining that the owners did not
witness harm to the pet).
205. See 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 70/16.3.
206. Id.
207. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403.
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necessarily require that the injury occur in the owner's presence and with the
owner's awareness. The Tennessee statute is also ambiguous as to the class
of people who can recover, enumerating only the "pet's owner or caretaker,"
when "caretaker" could refer to the great number of people who may assist
in the care-taking of a pet at any period of time. 0 8
The courts and legislatures permitting non-economic damages in pet
cases have allowed these damages absent boundaries to reasonably "limit
liability and establish meaningful rules for application by litigants and lower
courts., 20 9 Their sanctioning of open-ended recoveries hearkens back to the
Dillon v. Legg days when California allowed the "limitless exposure to
liability that the pure foreseeability test" provided.21 °
3. When Courts Allow Non-Economic Damages in Pet Cases, They
Step Outside of the Institutional Bounds of the Judiciary and
Undertake Changes That Should Be Left to the Legislature
In its decision to bar non-economic damages in a negligence claim
against a veterinarian and animal hospital, a Michigan appellate court 2 l'
recognized that legislatures are the place where changes to the availability of
damages in pet cases must be made:
There are several factors that must be considered before expanding
or creating tort liability, including, but not limited to, legislative and
judicial policies. In this case, there is no statutory, judicial, or other
persuasive authority that compels or permits this Court to take the
drastic action proposed by plaintiff. Case law on this issue from
sister states is not consistent, persuasive, or sufficient precedent.
We refuse to create a remedy where there is no legal structure in
which to give it support. However, plaintiff and others are free to
urge the Legislature to visit this issue in light of public policy
considerations ....212
As the Michigan court appreciated, courts are institutions suited to
adjudicate rights of the individual parties. They are not equipped to make
208. See id.
209. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 828 (Cal. 1989) (en bane).
210. Id. at 821.
211. Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000), appeal denied, 631
N.W.2d 339 (Mich. 2001).
212. Id. at 211.
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sweeping changes to traditional tort law principles, to provide prospective
notice to defendants of any changes to the law, or to create detailed statutory
holdings that can adequately constrain or limit damages in the pet law
213context. Unlike the legislature, they are not in a position to hold hearings
on the subject. They are confined to arguments before the court. The
question of whether to allow non-economic damages in pet cases affects
veterinarians, pet owners, insurers, manufacturers of veterinary medicines,
and others. The interests of this group need to be heard, weighed, and
balanced in a legislative forum. For these reasons, the sweeping change of
allowing non-economic damages in pet cases, if allowed at all, should be
instituted by state legislatures, not the courts.
a. Allowing Non-Economic Damages in Pet Cases Constitutes a
Sweeping Change to Two Hundred Years of Tort Law That
Warrants Legislative Consideration
For much of this nation's history, courts have developed tort law in a
slow, incremental fashion. In recent years, however, a few courts have
abandoned this incremental approach. This has resulted in "potentially large
adverse consequences to the nation's civil justice system and to those who
must abide by its rules.
2 14
For more than two hundred years, a fundamental principle of tort law
has been that pets are property in the eyes of the law.215 As this article has
shown, this characterization is not designed to denigrate pets, but is a legal
classification based on public policy. Since non-economic damages
traditionally cannot be recovered for injuries to property, they have not been
available in pet cases.216 The reason for this basic rule in pet law is simple:
in a world where injuries happen quite frequently and have "ramifying
consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end," the law serves
to "limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree. 21 7 One
court rejecting non-economic damages in pet law cases has warned, "[s]uch
an expansion of the law would place an unnecessary burden on the ever
burgeoning caseloads of the court in resolving serious tort claims for injuries
to individuals. 218
213. See id. (indicating that the court would "defer to the Legislature" to create such remedies).
See also Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring-Should Tort Law Say Yes?, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 1057, 1072-77 (1999) [hereinafter Medical Monitoring]
214. Medical Monitoring, supra note 213, at 1073.
215. Veterinarians in the Doghouse, supra note 35, at 43.
216. See discussion infra Part II.
217. Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
218. Id.
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Changing the tort law to allow plaintiffs to recover non-economic
damage for the loss of their property is an abrupt change from a fundamental
principle of tort law. Likewise, changing the tort law to remove pets from
the legal category of property, opening the door to more expanded damages,
is also a vast departure from traditional tort law. Either of these sweeping
changes warrant legislative consideration.
b. Sweeping Changes to Tort Law, Such as Allowing Non-Economic
Damages in Pet Cases, Warrants the Prospective Notice That Only
a Legislature Can Provide to Potential Defendants
Any change to long-standing principles of tort law ought to be left to the
legislature because the courts' retroactive focus, although possibly
appropriate when implementing minor adjustments to common law
principles, is not appropriate when the "adjustments" precipitate a broad,
fundamental change in an available tort remedy.219 If the tort system adopts
the novel remedy of allowing non-economic damages in pet cases, thereby
denoting a sweeping change to the rights and responsibilities of the public,
the change should be done prospectively to provide "fair notice" to those
potentially affected.
c. Courts Cannot Create Detailed Statutory Holdings That Can
Adequately Constrain or Limit Damages in the Pet Law Context
Should courts allow non-economic damages for the negligent injury to a
pet, they will have to detail the criteria for when recovery is allowed, since
open-ended recovery could deluge the courts with claims. Thus far, courts
have not demonstrated an ability to articulate consistent eligibility
requirements. 220 They have not identified in their holdings the class of
animals for which owners will be able to recover non-economic damages or
the class of individuals who are eligible to recover for injuries to pets.
Unless clear criteria for these claims are established, a flood of new lawsuits
is likely to come. Without properly defining the class of individuals entitled
to recover, fundamental issues are unclear: Are claims restricted to actual
owners? How is ownership defined? For example, suppose an individual is
caring for a pet that is "owned" by a friend or relative, and the animal is
219. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1071 (Haw. 1981);
Knowles Animal Hosp., Inc. v. Wills, 360 So. 2d 37, 38-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Peloquin v.
Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 367 So. 2d 1246, 1251 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
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injured while the pet is in the individual's custody. Courts may also face
claims by owners of exotic animals, not typically considered to be pets. As
a result, courts are likely to become clogged with speculative non-economic
damage claims. Plaintiffs' lawyers will be encouraged to push the outer
envelope of uncertain law.
The criteria, or lack thereof, for non-economic damages in pet cases will
lead to inconsistent decisions among jurisdictions, causing disparate
treatment of similarly situated plaintiffs and costly litigation as parties
attempt to clarify their rights and duties.221 The legislature, rather than the
courts, is better equipped to determine a standard for allowing non-economic
damages in pet cases.222
V. THE ADVERSE PUBLIC POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF ALLOWING NON-
ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN PET CASES
The public policy ramifications of allowing non-economic damages in
pet cases are great. Permitting non-economic damages in pet cases will
likely cause harm to veterinarians, manufacturers of pet medicines, pet
owners, and even pets themselves.
A. Non-Economic Damages in Pet Suits Will Harm Veterinarians and
Other Animal Health Providers
Veterinarians are being sued with increasing frequency in recent
years.223 As Professor Cupp has noted regarding pet lawsuits, "[t]he most
inviting targets for such lawsuits typically are veterinarians. As with human
doctors, negligence by vets frequently causes injury or death, and statistics
indicate that owners are increasingly likely to sue over such negligence. '
224
In fact, Professor Cupp has stated, "[n]ot long ago the American Veterinary
Medical Association (AMVA) Professional Liability Insurance Trust
responded to approximately 1,200 veterinary malpractice claims each year;
by 1999 that number had risen to approximately 2,000 claims-a 66 percent
,,221increase.
221. A lack of consistency and specificity in judicially-created eligibility standards has proved
disastrous in asbestos litigation. Cf Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a
Need for an Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1852-59 (1992) (discussing the
different treatment accorded pleural plaque claims in different jurisdictions). Trials essentially have
become "games of chance" because of the lack of clearly delineated standards for recovery. Id.
Even when similarly situated plaintiffs have tried their cases in the same jurisdiction, awards have
been inconsistent. Id
222. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
223. See Huss, supra note 162, at 492.
224. Veterinarians in the Doghouse, supra note 35, at 43.
225. Id. (footnote omitted)
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As a result of the increasing exposure of veterinarians to liability, the
costs of veterinary insurance are likely to rise. Insurers for veterinarians
have already expressed concern about the potential effects of pet lawsuits.
226
Typically, for insurers, when damages that are being recovered in lawsuits
are limited to economic damages, they are reasonable and predictable.
When wild-card non-economic damages are added to the equation, however,
actuaries cannot accurately predict the likely costs of lawsuits.227 As this
occurs more frequently, veterinary liability costs, formerly predictable, will
have no objective predictive measure. As a result, insurers must
substantially increase reserves for potential claims. This process will likely
result in an increase in premiums and deductibles. There may even be exits
from the veterinary insurance field, creating less competition. This process
could drive up costs of insurance even higher, causing vets to bear the brunt
of the increased costs.
228
In the medical malpractice context, parallel increases in non-economic
damages and accompanying high insurance rates spawned a medical
malpractice liability crisis that still ravages parts of the country. 229 A
PriceWaterhouseCoopers study concluded that litigation accounted for 7%
of the increase in rising costs of health insurance premiums. In 2002, the
Department of Heath and Human Services reported that "[t]he cost of the
226. Richard Marosi, Every Dog Has His Day in Court, L.A. TIMES, May 24, 2000, at Al.
Some insurers for veterinarians... worry that the success of animal law will leave them
overwhelmed with litigation, pushing up the costs of animal health care. 'Someday there
is going to be a precedent that says animals are more than chattel. It's something we're
afraid is definitely going to happen,' said Jay O'Brien, executive vice president of ABD
Insurance Services, a leading veterinary insurance company. 'The problem is that it
leaves it wide open for lawyers to ask for what they want.'
Id.
227. See Huss, supra note 162, at 532 ("Uncertainty alone, especially in jurisdictions where there
have been higher than expected judgments or settlements, could also lead to increased [insurance]
rates.").
228. See Greg A. Scoggins, Legislation Without Representation: How Veterinary Medicine Has
Slipped Through the Cracks of Tort Reform, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 953, 965 (1990) ("Because of...
economic constraints on owners,... veterinarians will likely bear a great deal of this [insurance
price] increase.").
229. AM. TORT REFORM FOUND, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004 12, 19, 28, 30 & 35 (2004), at
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2004) [hereinafter JUDICIAL HELLHOLES]
(noting that the medical malpractice crisis is still raging in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Madison
County, Illinois; St. Clair County, Illinois; the state of Florida; and the District of Columbia).
230. AM. MED. ASS'N, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM-NOw!, 8-9 (2005), at http://www.ama-
assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/-1/mlrnowjunel42005.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2004) [hereinafter
MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM-Now!] (citing PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, AM. ASS'N OF HEALTH
PLANS, THE FACTORS FUELING RISING HEALTHCARE COSTS, 3 (2002), at
http://www/aahp.org/IntemalLinks/PwCFinalReport.pdf) (last visited Feb. 12, 2004)).
excesses of the litigation system are reflected in the rapid increases in the
cost of liability insurance coverage. Premiums are spiking across all
specialties in 2002. ' '231
The availability of non-economic damages specifically contributed to
the insurance problems in the medical malpractice crisis. A 2003 study of
the states with the greatest medical malpractice crises by Blue Cross/Blue
Shield uncovered the idea that "inappropriately large jury verdicts are the
primary factor contributing to increasing medical liability premiums. '232
The United States Department of Health and Human Services issued a report
concluding that premium increases were disproportionately higher in states
with unbounded availability of non-economic damages:
2001 premium increases in states without litigation reform ranged
from 30%-75%. In 2002, the situation has deteriorated. States
without reasonable limits on non-economic damages have
experienced the largest increases by far, with increases of between
36%-113% in 2002. States with reasonable limits on non-economic
damages have not experienced the same rate spiking.
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Further, the Department of Health and Human Services reported that the
costs of non-economic damages were so high that imposing "reasonable
limits" on these damages "would reduce the amount of taxpayers' money the
federal government spends by up to $50.6 billion per year., 234
The situation of veterinarians may become similar to medical doctors
who have faced this same phenomenon.235 Increased "financial pressure
could cause veterinarians to leave the practice and could decrease interest in
this field., 23 6 Since veterinarians make well under half the average salary of
medical doctors, any rate increase is likely to hit them even more harshly
than the medical community.
237
231. MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM-Now!, supra note 230, at 6 (citing OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
UPDATE ON MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS: NOT THE RESULT OF THE "INSURANCE CYCLE" (2002)).
232. MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM-NOW!, supra note 230, at 4.
233. Id. at 9 (citing OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SPECIAL UPDATE ON MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS (2002), at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/mlupdl .htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2004)).
234. Id. at 9 (citing OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADDRESSING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: REFORMING
THE MEDICAL LITIGATION SYSTEM TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 11 (2003)).
235. See Scoggins, supra note 228, at 954-59 ("The veterinary profession now faces many of the
same problems that the human medical profession confronted in the mid-1970s and 1980s-higher
premiums, higher damage awards, and higher claim numbers."); MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM-
NOW!, supra note 230, at 3-4; JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, supra note 229, at 12, 19,28,30 & 35.
236. Huss, supra note 162, at 531.
237. Id. at 491. "Certainly the compensation for the average veterinarian is far less than for a
medical doctor. Nationwide, the average salary for veterinarians is $60,910 compared with dentist
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Compounding these problems, allowing claims for non-economic
damages will create new incentives to pursue baseless claims that simply
seek a modest "settlement." Nevertheless, these baseless claims may harm
the reputations of veterinarians, accelerating a rise in their insurance
premiums. In general, an increase in insurance rates could lead to a potential
exodus of good veterinarians from the field, leaving those remaining
disproportionately burdened.
B. Non-Economic Damages in Pet Suits Will Harm Manufacturers of
Medicines for Animals
In considering the strategy of filing a lawsuit against a veterinarian who
has no or little insurance who negligently prescribes veterinary medicine to a
pet, plaintiffs' attorneys will be tempted to target the veterinary medicine
manufacturer. Even though the manufacturer played little or no role in
harming the animal, joint and several liability may allow the potential of
large damages against the manufacturer if the veterinarian is judgment-proof
or has little or no insurance.23 The increased availability of non-economic
damages in pet cases will likely make these suits very appealing to trial
attorneys.
The benefits of holding a manufacturer who played little or no role in
harming a pet responsible are far outweighed by the fact that these suits
would impact the production, research, and development of new and current
medicines. Liability against pharmaceutical manufacturers has a history of
reducing the number of beneficial products available to American
and doctor mean incomes (in 1999) of $125,358 and $163,000, respectively." Id. (citing Lisa
Heyamoto, Vets Love the Work and the Pets, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Aug. 21, at 3; Steve Dale,
Clients, Vets Speak Out on Billing Practices, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 21, 2002, at E3); See
also Scoggins, supra note 228, at 954, 965 (noting the disparity in doctor and vet incomes and also
commenting that "[t]he veterinary profession provides an interesting example of a group ill-equipped
to absorb a liability crisis.").
238. The rule of joint liability, commonly called joint and several liability, provides that when two
or more persons engage in conduct that might subject them to individual liability and their conduct
produces a single, indivisible injury, each defendant will be liable for the total amount of damages.
See Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 2004 (I11. 983). The principle underlying joint
liability is that each defendant's wrongful conduct is substantial enough to pay for the plaintiff's
injury, so the plaintiff should be fully compensated and should not suffer if one defendant is absent
from the jurisdiction or insolvent. Over the past two decades, the shortcomings of joint liability
rules have become increasingly apparent. In many of its operations, it means that a defendant only
minimally at fault bears a disproportionate burden. Though a substantial majority of states have
abolished or modified the traditional doctrine, a distinct minority of sixteen jurisdictions have yet to
abolish or modify their joint liability rules. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 17 cmt. a (2000)
(surveying state joint liability laws).
consumers. A Conference Board survey of more than 2,000 chief executive
officers found that thirty-six percent of the companies had discontinued
product lines as a result of actual liability experience and that eleven percent
of the companies had done so based on anticipated liability problems.239
In some cases, consumers have lost the use of a unique product
altogether. For example, due to unwarranted products liability litigation,
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals withdrew its anti-nausea morning sickness
drug, Bendectin, from the market in 1983 .240 Although the drug had been
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and was widely
acclaimed by health care professionals, Merrell Dow's legal defense costs
were far in excess of the amount received in annual sales of Bendectin.241
For similar reasons, G.D. Searle & Co., a subsidiary of Monsanto, withdrew
the Copper-7 intrauterine device from the market in 1986, even though the
product had been approved by the FDA and used for many years.242
Furthermore, two of the three companies manufacturing the DPT vaccine
stopped producing it in 1984 in light of rising product liability costs. 24 3 As a
result, the Center for Disease Control asked doctors to stop vaccinating
children over age one to conserve the limited supply of the vaccine. 2"
Fears of liability also discourage the research and innovation of new
treatments. The Conference Board, a well-known organization that performs
business research, surveyed 500 chief executive officers of large U.S.
corporations about the impact of the tort system on their companies.2 45 The
study reported "that roughly one-third of all firms surveyed, and nearly half
of those claiming 'major impacts,' had decided against introducing new
products because of liability fears. 246 An American Medical Association
study on the development of new medical technologies revealed that:
Innovative new products are not being developed or are being
withheld from the market because of liability concerns or inability
to obtain adequate insurance. Certain older technologies have been
removed from the market, not because of sound scientific evidence
239. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSP., PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT OF 1997,
S. REP. NO. 105-32, at 8 (1997) [hereinafter PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT] (citing McQUIRE,
CONFERENCE BOARD, RESEARCH REPORT NO. 908, 19 THE IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY TABLE
28 (1998)).
240. Id. at 7.
241. See id.
242. See Betsy Morris, Monsanto Unit Stops Marketing Its JUDs in U.S., WALL ST. J., Feb. 3,
1986.
243. See PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT, supra note 239, at 10.
244. See id.
245. See PETER W. HUBER & ROBERT LITAN, Overview, in THE LIABILITY MAZE (Peter W. Huber
& Robert Litan eds., The Brookings Institution 1991).
246. Id. at 6.
264
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indicating lack of safety or efficacy, but because product liability
suits have exposed manufacturers to unacceptable financial risks.247
Regarding the impact of increased liability on pharmaceutical research, the
American Medical Association noted that from the early 1970s to 1988, the
number of pharmaceutical companies actively pursuing research on
contraceptives and fertility declined from thirteen companies to only one
company. 48 The report concluded, "[u]nless the liability laws are drastically
altered, it is very unlikely that pharmaceutical companies will aggressively
pursue research in this area.,
249
In contrast, experience in the AIDS research area demonstrates that
pharmaceutical research and development revives when liability is brought
back within reasonable, predictable limits. For instance, a leading
"California biotechnology company... scuttle[d] its promising AIDS
vaccine program" when liability concerns grew high in the state.2 5 0 But the
company revived the program "when the state's legal climate changed" to
alleviate some liability concerns. 25' Furthermore, one company with a
promising vaccine for HIV-infected pregnant women totally left Tennessee,
where it had planned to conduct research at Vanderbilt University, because
Tennessee's laws did not provide "much protection against liability. 252 The
company decided to hold the drug trials in Connecticut instead once a new
Connecticut law offered legal protection to companies testing AIDS
vaccines in pregnant women.253
If non-economic damages are increasingly allowed in pet cases,
plaintiffs' attorneys will undoubtedly seek to hold deep-pocket animal
pharmaceutical manufacturers jointly and severally responsible for the harm.
History foretells that any increased exposure and liability of the
manufacturers will discourage the development of new drugs with the
potential of saving the lives and curing diseases of animals in the future. As
a result, manufactures may have decreased desires to participate in animal
health research and development, harming pets themselves.
247. Id. at 7.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Jon Cohen, Is Liability Slowing the AIDS Vaccines?, SCIENCE, Apr. 10, 1992, at 168,
available at 1992 WLNR 2621168.




C. Non-Economic Damages in Pet Suits Will Harm Pet Owners
As one commentator notes, "[a]n important public policy is to provide
an atmosphere where veterinarians can provide services at reasonable prices
to as large a number of animals as possible while supporting the general tort
goals of compensation, deterrence, and affirmance of societal values. 254
This goal of "reasonable prices" for veterinary costs is jeopardized with
increased liability in pet cases. As Professor Cupp has suggested regarding
allowing emotional distress damages in pet cases, "[a]n increase in available
damages, and the increased litigation that results, might raise the price of
veterinary services. Veterinarians would be required to purchase more
insurance, and they would pass on as much of the cost as possible to
consumers."
255
Fears of increased liability may in turn "cause veterinarians to change
their practices and to begin performing more defensive medicine," further
fueling the cost increase that will accompany greater risk of liability.256 As a
result, "veterinarians will order more expensive tests" at unnecessary and
high costs to pet owners.257 Ultimately, this "higher cost of veterinary care
91258
could price this treatment beyond some people's ability to pay ....
Increased veterinary costs will create very challenging choices for pet
owners and unfortunate results for pets.
D. Non-Economic Damages in Pet Suits Will Harm Pets
While many proponents of non-economic damages in pet cases earnestly
believe these damages will provide better treatment for animals, they have
overlooked an unintended consequence of their pursuit: allowing non-
economic damage in pet cases could actually have the effect of causing more
suffering for pets.259 As Professor Cupp notes,
The demand for veterinary medicine for pets is much more elastic
than the demand for human medicine. Although consumers will
spend a lot of money for life-saving human medical procedures,
many pet owners have a limit--often a few hundred dollars or
less--on how much they will spend on veterinary services. With
254. Huss, supra note 162, at 532-33.
255. Veterinarians in the Doghouse, supra note 35, at 48.
256. Huss, supra note 162, at 531.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Barking Up the Wrong Tree, supra note 37, at B5; Veterinarians in the Doghouse, supra note
35, at 48; Marosi, supra note 226, at Al ("Veterinarians believe animal health care costs would
skyrocket under an avalanche of litigation. Ironically, they say, animals would suffer because
owners would not be able to afford treatment.").
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higher prices, fewer pet owners could (or would) pay for needed
veterinary medicine; in turn, more animals would suffer. In effect,
pet owners would be compensated at the cost of their pets' health
and lives. 6°
Increased veterinary prices will leave fewer owners willing or able to pay for
veterinary care. As a result, "more pets would suffer with untreated
ailments., 26' Also, many more pets would likely be "put to sleep" because
costs of treatment are too high.262
Besides deterring owners from seeking veterinary treatment, there are
other ways that the threat of increased veterinarian liability harms pets.
First, the practice of defensive medicine by veterinarians who fear liability
may put animals through unnecessary treatments that may cause pets
discomfort or even death. Second, increased insurance costs and the added
pressure to see more patients to make up for lost profits will combine to
prevent veterinarians from having the time to engage in pro bono activities
that benefit animals, such as free spaying and neutering services, vaccination
clinics, and discounts to poor families with sick pets. Third, increased fears
of liability may stop veterinarians from trying to save extremely ill or
traumatically injured animals that may require risky treatment as their only
chance at survival. Veterinarians may not risk the potential liability that
may accompany risky procedures that veterinarians would not have hesitated
undertaking in the past.
Unfortunately, the pursuit of non-economic damages by well-
intentioned animal advocates may end up harming exactly those the
advocates seek to help: defenseless animals. Lucrative non-economic
damages in pet cases may end up thickening plaintiffs' attorneys' wallets
with contingency fees at the expense of pets. These damages will benefit
only the small number of owners who ever receive them at the grave and
great cost to all pets.
260. Veterinarians in the Doghouse, supra note 35, at 48. A 1999 study reveals that pet owners
would pay $688 for treatment for their pets if there is a 75% chance of recovery and only about $356
if there is a 10% chance of recovery. John P. Brown & Jon D. Silverman, The Current and Future
Market for Veterinarians and Veterinary Medical Services in the United States, 215:2 J. AM.
VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 161, 167 (1999).
261. Barking Up the Wrong Tree, supra note 37, at B5.
262. See Huss, supra note 162, at 531. "The higher cost of veterinary care... may increase the
rate of euthanization of animals." Id. (citing Kathleen Burge, Appeals Court Weighs the Value of
Family Pets, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 25, 2001, at BI).
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VI. LEGISLATIVE CAPS ON NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN PET SUITS ARE
NOT A HELPFUL COMPROMISE
Some proponents and opponents of non-economic damages in pet law
cases believe that a reasonable compromise to end their debate about the
appropriateness of these damages is to allow non-economic damages by
statute with damage caps.2 63 The Tennessee statute allowing non-economic
damages in pet cases presents one such "compromise" and caps the
maximum non-economic damages that pet owners can recover at $5,000. 264
Indeed, history and practice illustrate that caps do not result in a compromise
265limiting damages. Instead, caps mean an eventual surrender that will
allow unbounded damages.
A. A Page in History Illuminates the Danger of "Compromise" in the
Form of Non-Economic Damage Caps
The history of damage caps in wrongful death statutes is instructive to
veterinarians and others who may be warming to a "modest cap" on non-
economic damages in pet cases. In the 1800s and earlier, no causes of action
were allowed for wrongful death.266 Courts expressed concern that damages
would be uncertain and potentially explosive in size.267 In the late 1800s, the
British Parliament enacted "Lord Campbell's Act," which allowed claims
for wrongful death under strict controls, including curbing damages to pure
out-of-pocket costs. 2 68 In the early 1900s, states began to enact wrongfuldeath statutes modeled on Lord Campbell's Act.2 69  A majority of these
263. See discussion supra Part IV.A.3.
264. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(a)(1).
265. See discussion infra Part VI.A.
266. In Baker v. Bolton (1808) 170 Eng. Rep. 1033, Lord Ellenborough declared that "[i]n a civil
Court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury." This case is credited
with originating the English common law rule that a person had no cause of action against a
tortfeasor for causing the death of another. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 165, at § 127,
at 945.
267. See PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS, supra note 8, at 575 n., 577 n.9.
268. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 389 (1970) ("[A]brogating the rule
was Lord Campbell's Act."); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 165, § 127, at 945. This statute
allowed the personal representative of a victim to recover for the benefit of close relatives for their
pecuniary loss, so long as the victim would have had a cause of action had he or she survived. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 925 (1977).
269. See PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS, supra note 8, at 570 n.3. New York adopted
the first "wrongful death act" in 1847. See McDavid v. United States, 584 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2003)
(discussing the history of wrongful death acts and ruling that, under West Virginia's expansive law,
a court may award pain and suffering endured between the time of injury and the time of death, even
when the decedent did not institute an action for personal injury prior to his or her death, so long as
there is evidence of conscious pain and suffering of the decedent prior to death).
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statutes strictly limited damages to actual out-of-pocket losses.270 About half
of the states enacting wrongful death statutes 'ontained restrictions on the
amounts that could be awarded, capping damages at rather modest figures
ranging from $5,000 to $20,000.271 These states capped damages for the
same reason the common law rejected actions for wrongful death: there was
the potential for damages to become "out of sight" because of emotions
about loss of a loved one.272
But these wrongful death damage caps disappeared over time.273 Some
caps were held unconstitutional under state constitutions as violative of
equal protection or the right to jury trial.274 The history of wrongful death
damages-first extremely constricted, then expanded but capped, and finally
unbounded by any cap in some states-foretells that capped non-economic
damage provisions will simply provide a foot in the door to wider
recognition of the damages in the future.
B. Damage Caps Will Encourage Litigation
Allowing non-economic damages, albeit with caps, solidifies their
legitimacy. Once plaintiffs' lawyers can attain non-economic damages, they
will have a great incentive to push the envelope and have these laws held
unconstitutional. A study of short-lived non-economic damage caps in the
medical malpractice context illustrates that caps do not last for long.
As discussed earlier in this article, 275 non-economic damages in medical
malpractice cases spawned a medical malpractice liability crisis that still
ravages parts of the country. During the 1980s, state legislators sought to
provide some predictability in the amount of non-economic damage awards
270. McDavid, 584 S.E.2d at 231.
271. See PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS, supra note 8, at 577 n.9.
272. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 165, at 951 (citing Blake v. Midland R. Co. (1852) 118 Eng.
Rep. 42 (Q.B.)); PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS, supra note 8, at 575 n. 1, 577 n.9.
273. PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS, supra note 8, at 577 n.9 ("No modem American
jurisdiction limits recovery for pecuniary losses, although some do limit recovery for non-pecuniary
losses.").
274. See, e.g., Trovato v. DeVeau, 736 A.2d 1212 (N.H. 1999) (finding that a statute limiting
damages in wrongful death cases to $50,000 where the decedent was not survived by a family
member violated equal protection provision of New Hampshire Constitution); Lakin v. Senco Prods.,
Inc., 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999) (finding that a $500,000 limit on non-economic damages in personal
injury and wrongful death actions arising out of common law violated right to jury trial provision of
Oregon Constitution).
275. See discussion supra Part VI.A.
269
as a way of lending stability to dropping insurance markets.276 Excessive
losses during that decade had resulted in insurance companies raising
premiums and canceling or refusing to issue policies for certain high-risk
activities. 27 This made it difficult for health care professionals engaged in
risky activities, such as obstetric medicine, to obtain liability insurance.278
Policymakers believed that limits on non-economic damages would render
damages awards more predictable and help stabilize the insurance
industry.279 As a result, lawmakers in a number of states enacted statutory
limits either directly on non-economic damages280 or on total damages.2 11
These statutes quickly came under fire. In fact, "[p]laintiffs' lawyers in
key litigation states such as Alabama, Florida and Texas challenged statutory
caps on non-economic damages as unconstitutional. 282 They were most
successful in invalidating these statutes when they used provisions of state
constitutions, rather than the United States Constitution.283  State
276. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg, et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling Pain and
Suffering, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 908-09 (1989).
277. See id. at. 909.
278. Id. at. 925.
279. Id. at 909, 912, 928; State of Maryland, Report of the Governor's Task Force to Study
Liability Insurance 10 (Dec. 1985) (concluding that a $250,000 cap would "help contain awards
within realistic limits").
280. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (2004) ($400,000 limit on non-economic damages);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (1997) ($250,000 limit on non-economic damages); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-64-302 (2003) ($250,000 limit on non-economic damages unless the court finds justification
through good cause, thereby increasing the limit; FLA. STAT. §§ 766.207, 766.209 (2005) ($250,000
limit on non-economic damages); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9(2) (2004) ($375,000 limit on
damages for pain and suffering with certain classes of torts excepted); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603
(2004) ($250,000 cap on non-economic damages); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-1902, 60-1903 (2001)
($250,000 limit on noneconomic damages); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 4313 (2001) ($250,000
limit on non-economic damages); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (2002) ($500,000
limit on non-punitive non-economic damages); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (2001)
($500,000 limit on total damages and $500,000 limit on non-economic damages with exceptions
allowed for special circumstances); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1483 (2003) ($280,000 limit on non-
economic damages with exceptions); MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.210 (2001) ($350,000 cap on non-
economic damages); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (2003) ($250,000 limit on non-economic
damages); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-42-02 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-08, 32-42-02 (2001)
($500,000 limit on non-economic damages); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (2002) ($400,000 limit
on non-punitive, non-economic damages); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8 (2001 & Supp. 2003)
($250,000 limit on non-economic damages); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 893.55, 895.04 (2001) ($350,000
cap on non-economic damages).
281. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-14-3 (2001) ($1,250,000 limit on total damages); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42 (2001) ($500,000 limit on total damages); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6
(2001 & Supp. 2004) ($600,000 limit on total damages except for punitive damages and medical
expenses); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11 (2000) ($500,000 cap on total damages); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.303 (2005) (articulating the total damages in wrongful death
actions); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (2001) ($1,500,000 cap on total damages).
282. Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards supra note 13, at 61.
283. Often "open courts" provisions in state constitutions are used to attack limits on non-
economic damages. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,
84-87, 93 (1978) (holding that the Price-Anderson Act, which preempted state tort law in order to
270
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constitutions often have broadly worded provisions that have not received
much, if any, judicial attention.284 This use of state constitutional provisions
makes it easy for plaintiffs' lawyers to preclude appeal to the United States
Supreme Court.285 Limits on non-economic damages were struck down in
Alabama, Florida, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, Utah and
Washington state.286 While these cases involved caps placed on existing
lines of liability, part of their reasoning could apply to a "cap" on a newly-
created right of damages.2 87 These decisions voiced the view that only
courts, not legislatures, could place limits on tort damages.288
promote the nuclear power industry, does not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of
the United States Constitution); see also Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Leavy Mathews
III, Federalism and Federal Liability Reform: The United States Constitution Supports Reform, 36
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 269 (1999) (discussing a century of congressional enactments changing state
liability law and the numerous decisions consistently holding those statutes constitutional). As a
practical matter, these provisions are intended to provide citizens of a state with justice and
reasonable access to the courts. Open court provisions, however, can be stretched to suggest that
any time a legislature in any way limits any person's rights to sue, it is violative of the "open courts"
provision. See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Judicial Nullification of Civil Justice Reform
Violates the Fundamental Federal Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers: How to Restore
the Right Balance, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 932 & n.28 (2001) [hereinafter Judicial Nullification]
(collecting cases).
284. See Judicial Nullification, supra note 283; see also infra note 285 and accompanying text.
285. For a more thorough discussion of this issue, see Judicial Nullification, supra note 283;
Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Monica G. Parham, Fostering Mutual Respect and
Cooperation Between State Courts and State Legislatures: A Sound Alternative to a Tort Tug of
War, 103 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 5 (2000); Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Regulation Through
Litigation Has Just Begun: What You Can Do To Stop It, Briefly (National Legal Center for the
Public Interest 1999).
Unlike some state supreme courts, the United States Supreme Court has historically been
reluctant to overturn economic legislation that does not violate fundamental rights. See supra note
283 and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n., 347 N.E.2d 736, 744 (I1l. 1976) ($500,000
limitation on recovery in medical malpractice actions violated equal protection guarantee);
Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1236-37 (N.H. 1991) (statute imposing $875,000 limitation on
non-economic damages recoverable in actions for personal injury violated state constitution's equal
protection guarantee); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 836-38 (N.H. 1980) (statute imposing
$250,000 limitation on non-economic damages recoverable in medical malpractice actions violated
state constitution's equal protection guarantee); Ameson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D.
1978) (statute imposing $300,000 limit on damages recoverable in medical malpractice action
violated state and federal equal protection guarantees); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 772-73
(Ohio 1991) (statute imposing $200,000 limit on "general" damages recoverable in medical
malpractice action violated state due process guarantee); Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348,
364 (Utah 1989) (statute limiting medical malpractice liability of state hospital to $100,000 violated
provisions of state constitution).
287. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
288. See id.
The history of damage caps in the wrongful death and medical liability
contexts indicates that capped damages are not a real, practical compromise.
Once caps are established, the "burgeoning herd"2 89 of animal law attorneys
can quickly seek to challenge the caps under state constitutional principles.
Since these caps are abolished by state court decisions citing state
constitutional provisions,29 ° there is very little chance that the Supreme
Court of the United States will ever overturn the courts' decisions. Thus, for
opponents of non-economic damages in the pet law arena, the "compromise"
of allowing capped damages equals a surrender paving the way to full
recognition of unlimited non-economic damages in pet cases.
C. Damage Caps Will Still Harm Animals
Allowing non-economic damages, albeit with caps, will still harm
animals by raising the costs of veterinary visits. Research has shown that
even small changes in the costs of veterinary visits deter owners from
seeking treatment for their pets.291 Indeed, a recent study reveals the direct
correlation between veterinary prices and treatment for animals, showing
that an increase of veterinary service prices of 10% will result in a 4.3%
decrease in the demand for such services.292 Any increase in the cost of
veterinary care, however small, inevitably will harm pets, something the law
should not condone.
VII. CONCLUSION
Two traditional principles of tort law-that pets are property and that
damages to property are limited to its fair market value-have for two
hundred years supported the proposition that non-economic damages cannot
be awarded in pet lawsuits. The public policy reasons for this rule are clear.
Non-economic damages in pet law are unsound public policy and can lead to
harm to many who are concerned for the welfare of animals: veterinarians
whose professional goal is to help animals, manufacturers who engage in the
discovery of new medicines to help animals, the owners who love their pets,
and pets themselves. Capping non-economic damages is not a helpful
289. Marosi, supra note 226, at Al. Also reporting that:
In the last two years, the number of attorneys registered as members with the Animal
Legal Defense Fund has mushroomed from 450 to 600. And across the country, eager
law students crowd classrooms for lessons on such topics as 'Capital Punishment of
Animals.' A total of twelve law schools offer such courses, up from five just five years
ago.
Id.
290. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
291. See Brown & Silverman, supra note 260, at 168.
292. Id.
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"compromise," for history has shown that damage caps are easily assailed
and ultimately overturned. It is crucial that courts and legislatures resist the
urge to listen to well-intentioned animal rights advocates who ask for non-
economic damages in pet cases. Instead, courts should recognize that
allowing non-economic damages in pet cases will usher in a host of harmful
public policy consequences and an abrupt departure from established and
effective tort law.
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